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The Biden administration’s policy towards China 
will continue the multidimensional rivalry that 
the presidency of Donald Trump has permanently 
inscribed in US strategy. This trend is the subject 
of US bipartisan consensus. Furthermore, in re-
cent years, both the presidential administration 
and the Congress have become involved in meas-
ures aimed against the PRC. China’s actions are 
also guided by the logic of structural conflict. It 
has no hope that Biden’s presidency will help in 
easing its relations with the US, and now sees 
the confrontation as a permanent trend result-
ing from a fundamental divergence of interests. 
In the run-up to the election, Beijing stepped 
up its aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific area, 
and also took steps to become technologically 
and economically independent from the United 
States. The first Chinese press comments hinted 
at the possibility of improving communication 
with Washington, in order to reduce the risk of 
an uncontrolled escalation of military tension 
in the Pacific and bring about limited talks on 
climate and trade. Biden’s policy will therefore 
be determined by both the US establishment’s 
expectations that his administration will be more 
effective in containing China than Trump’s was, 
and by Beijing’s growing assertiveness on the 
international stage. 
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Joe Biden’s victory in the US presidential election means that Washington will continue its confron-
tational policy towards Beijing. At the same time, it will clearly change its tactics and attempt to 
mobilise the US’s network of alliances to contain China. On 13 November, China congratulated Biden 
and Kamala Harris, but highlighted the need to resolve possible legal disputes. The expected change 
in the US administration has been widely commented upon in the Chinese press. The initial reac-
tions from China reveal expectations that competition with Washington will continue in almost all 
key areas, although Beijing hopes to unblock some channels for diplomatic contacts. It also expects 
an extensive US-EU dialogue to begin discussing what actions should be taken with regard to the 
PRC. The first reactions from Europe suggest that this scenario is very likely. Biden’s victory has been 
presented as an opportunity for a joint response to the challenges linked to China by Heiko Maas, 
the German foreign minister, and some representatives of Brussels. However, creating a common 
front on Beijing will require a number of structural problems in transatlantic relations to be resolved, 
including in the areas of trade and services, digital technologies and security. 
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A change in American tactics
As regards US security policy, the containment 
of China’s military expansion, including increas-
ing the US’s presence in the Indo-Pacific region, 
is likely to remain among the top priorities. 
Co-operation within the QUAD format (the United 
States, Japan, India, Australia) will probably be 
stepped up. Support for Taiwan, which may be-
come the most heated point in the China-US ri-
valry in the Western Pacific, will also be continued. 
As the role of NATO is expected to strengthen under 
Biden’s administration, Washington may seek to 
use it to a greater extent for political coordination 
against Beijing, and for improving the allied states’ 
resilience towards threats related to the PRC.
The Trump administration strongly criticised the 
Chinese Communist Party as a totalitarian and 
undemocratic organisation, but Trump’s actions 
were mostly rhetorical. In the case of the Biden 
administration, human rights and democracy may 
become a real platform for international co-oper-
ation regarding China and the basis for imposing 
more severe sanctions on it (e.g. with regard to the 
situations in Hong Kong, Xinjiang or Taiwan), in-
cluding by creating broader coalitions among allies. 
There is currently a consensus in the US about the 
fundamental threats related to the pace of PRC 
technological development. Advanced technolo-
gies are crucial in terms of security, economic 
competitiveness, and the functioning of demo-
cratic countries. Trump’s campaign against Chi-
nese technological companies (including Huawei, 
Hikvision and TikTok) has so far generally been 
assessed in the United States as effective, includ-
ing by the Democrats. More instruments aimed at 
cutting off Chinese companies from components 
and technologies, striking at their supply chains, 
reducing access to the US and allied markets, etc. 
are likely to be introduced and developed under 
the Biden administration. However, there may be 
changes in some emphases, and to the priority 
technologies selected. Furthermore, supplies of 
components in less sensitive areas from the US to 
China will most likely continue, due to pressure 
from the relevant American business groups. 
The biggest policy change should be expected in 
the area of the US’s trade policy towards the PRC. 
There is relative consensus among the Democrats 
that Trump’s customs wars have been ineffective 
in forcing Beijing to make structural economic con-
cessions, although it is unlikely that any tariffs will 
be lifted. It is very probable that Biden will test the 
effectiveness of a return to the use of multilateral 
institutions and trade agreements in order to ‘en-
circle’ China economically and creating a separate 
economic co-operation frameworks for the devel-
oped countries, to which China will have no access. 
This may be manifested by attempts to reform 
multilateral organisations, including the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), as well as a possible return to 
regional trade agreements similar to TTP or the TTIP. 
However, the key question is whether Washington 
will find partners for similar initiatives among the 
Indo-Pacific and EU countries. Moreover, such initia-
tives must also be supported by Congress.
Mobilising America’s alliances
Given the priorities mentioned above, the new 
presidential administration is likely to establish 
broader co-operation on China with like-minded 
nations in the following several months. Relations 
with the Indo-Pacific region (Japan, India, Austral-
ia) had already been developed quite intensively 
during the Trump presidency, so the search for 
a ‘new start’ will mainly concern the countries of 
the European Union. The US will want to draw the 
EU into as many fields of rivalry with the PRC as 
possible, including security policy (examples would 
include NATO reforms regarding a joint response 
to threats from China, and increasing European 
countries’ defence spending), technological policy 
(including the regulation of digital markets) and 
defending human rights. The US will probably also 
be much more active in the issues of global climate 
agreements; this would facilitate coordination on 
the connectivity undertaken by the United States 
and the European Union in developing countries. 
Technological issues will remain the 
central element of the US policy of 
rivalry with China
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The US-EU dialogue on China may be successful, 
considering the high convergence of their eco-
nomic interests regarding China. These include 
the common goal of curbing Beijing’s unfair trade 
practices, through WTO reforms among other 
multilateral means. The awareness of the risk 
linked to the expansion of Chinese digital corpo-
rations has increased in numerous EU member 
states (including France, Scandinavia and Central 
Europe), as well as in the EU’s institutions. In 2020, 
as a result of China’s actions during the COVID-19 
pandemic, its aggressive diplomacy and the de 
facto liquidation of Hong Kong’s autonomy, voices 
inside the EU calling for a more assertive policy 
towards China have strengthened significantly. 
These trends have contributed to the EU-US dia-
logue, and led to the US Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo and the High Representative of the Eu-
ropean Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy Josep Borrell meeting this October for the 
first time to discuss the issue of China. 
Challenges to transatlantic dialogue 
on China 
However, any effective dialogue on China will 
require at least some of the bilateral tensions 
between the United States and the EU to be re-
solved. Washington will have to present a more 
partner-like approach based on multilateralism so 
that talks can begin. Many issues related to China 
also require the resolution of long-term conflicts 
strictly related to US-EU relations, including the 
predomination of US digital corporations in the EU, 
reforms of the European security system, the US 
returning to climate agreements, and the easing 
of trade tensions. There is a strong desire in some 
EU member states, especially in France and Ger-
many, to resolve these issues without American 
participation by building up a European ‘strategic 
autonomy’ or ‘digital sovereignty’. 
The success of such dialogue will also depend on 
the EU’s ability to adopt a common stance on 
China, which will be necessary for the talks with 
the US to be effective. This was supposed to be 
one of the priorities of the German presidency of 
the EU, but due to the pandemic – and also the 
lack of consensus on this issue within Germany 
itself – work on achieving this goal clearly slowed 
down. Despite the shift to a more assertive tone 
in the European debate, and also the branding of 
China in official communiqués as a ‘competitor’ 
and ‘systemic rival’, the EU’s more confrontational 
plans have still not been put into practice. This 
would require not only the adoption of a con-
sensus in the area of EU foreign policy towards 
the PRC, but also discussions on the shape and 
level of openness of the common EU market, as 
well as the future of the community’s industrial 
policy. So far, Beijing has successfully capitalised 
on the differences within the EU, focusing inter 
alia on bilateral relations with the largest countries. 
However, since the outbreak of the COVID-19 
pandemic and the end of Hong Kong’s autonomy, 
the effectiveness of Chinese diplomacy in Europe 
has clearly decreased. 
Given the difficulties outlined above, the attempts 
to find a transatlantic compromise on China may 
only partially succeed. In the first phase, the 
talks will concern reforms of the trade system, 
co-operation in the field of human rights, the 
regulation of the digital economy, climate policy, 
and connectivity with developing countries. This 
would create an opportunity to implement the 
Polish stance on selected issues at the level of EU 
relations. At the same time, Warsaw’s failure to 
take proactive measures in these areas carries the 
risk that Washington will seek an agreement with 
Germany and France at the expense of Poland’s 
interests. If the most important EU countries are 
not ready to compete with China in areas of key 
importance to the US, after some time the Biden 
administration may partially resume Trump’s policy, 
call the special importance of the transatlantic 
relationship into question, and try to capitalise 
on the differences between individual EU member 
states, especially by increasing its appreciation of 
the Central European approach. 
